THE

# TARKA-SANGRAHA

OF

# ANNAM BHAṬṬA,

WITH A

## HINDÍ PARAPHRASE AND ENGLISH VERSION.

PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE, BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

ALLAHABAD:
PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS.
*Rev.* JOS. WARREN, *Supt.*
1851.

# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE design of this Hindí paraphrase is to facilitate the reading of the popular Sanskrit compendium of the Nyáya Philosophy in the Hindí department of the College, and to call attention to some of the points in which the progress of science has led to changes of opinion since the time when Annam Bhaṭṭa wrote. These ends the version may at present subserve; but, in subsequent efforts in the same line, it is to be hoped that our pandits will gradually find the Hindí language becoming a more tractable instrument. At present it is in their hands emphatically a *lingua volgare.*

The English version has had the advantage of being revised, and in part constructed, by Mr. F. Edward Hall.

J. R. B.

*Benares College, 8th Sept.* 1851.

# TRANSLATION

## OF THE HINDÍ VERSION OF

## AND

# COMMENT

## ON THE TARKA-SANGRAHA.

---

This translation, into the Hindí language, of the compendious treatise, the *Tarka-Sangraha*, on the *Vaiśeshika śástra*, composed by the sacred teacher *Kaṇáda*, is made for this purpose, that people who know Sanskrit even a little, may understand this book with ease.

*Translation.*

Having placed in my heart the Lord of the world, [that is to say, having meditated on God,] and having saluted my preceptor, I compose this treatise, named the Compendium of Logical results for the pleasant comprehension of the uninstructed.

*Remarks.*

According to the opinion of the illustrious teacher *Kaṇáda,* the categories are seven. That is to say, there is not in the world any thing such that the name of it cannot be expressed by that of one or other of these categories. As—what is a Man?—we may say that he is a Substance:—and a Stone, which is a very different thing from a Man, is nevertheless a Substance. Redness, and Length, although they are different, are nevertheless both called Qualities. And, just so, whatever is understood by each several name, is amongst those seven categories.

*Translation.*

Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Difference, Co-inherence, and Non-existence,—these are the seven Categories.

*Remark.*

The definition of each category amongst these seven categories will be written down further on, for this reason, that synonymous terms for them do not exist in the *Hindí.*

*Translation.*

Amongst those [that is to say, amongst the Categories], Substances [that is to say, the abodes of Qualities] are nine—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul, and Mind.

*Remarks.*

Those learned in the science of Chemistry, dwelling in Eu-

rope, say that Water [which the Indian learned men say is an un-mixed substance] is formed of two airs; and, of these, the one air is the principal constituent of the air adapted for our breathing. The proof of this will be found detailed in chemical treatises.

Now, after this, Quality [that is to say, the character of a thing—as the character of Earth is Weight, and Colour, &c.] is spoken of. This is of twenty-four kinds.

*Translation.*

Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severalty, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit and Demerit, Faculty.

*Remark.*

Of these Qualities severally the definition will be written down further on. We now write down of how many kinds Action is.

*Translation.*

To throw upwards, to throw downwards, to contract, to expand, to go:—these are called the five Actions.

Genus [that is to say, a common nature, as the nature common to jars, the nature common to webs, &c.] is of two kinds —higher and lower.

*Remark.*

The definition of these will be found further on.

*Translation.*

Differences, which reside in eternal substances, are endless.

*Remarks.*

By "eternal substances" are understood Mind, Soul, Time, Atoms, &c. They call "Atom" that from which, according to the opinion of the followers of the *Nyáya*, the production of Earth, Water, &c., takes place.

*Translation.*

Co-inherence is one only.

Non-existence [that is to say, the fact of not existing] is of four kinds—antecedent non-existence, destruction, absolute non-existence, and mutual non-existence.

*Remark.*

After stating the divisions of the several categories, we now write down the definitions of the several Substances.

*Translation.*

They call "Earth" that in which there is the quality Odour. It is of two kinds, eternal and un-eternal. In its atomic character it is eternal; and when some product arises out of those atoms, then that is called un-eternal.

This [that is to say,—Earth in the character of a product] is of three kinds, through these differences—body, organ of sense, mass. The body is that of us men. The organ is the apprehender of odour, called the Smell, which resides in the fore-part of the nose. And the masses [that is to say, what have parts,] are clods, stones, &c.

What appears cold on touching it, that they call Water.

And that (namely, water) is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that is called un-eternal. In the form of products, water is of three kinds, through the difference of body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the world of Varuṇa; and the sense is the percipient of savour, which they call the Taste. It resides in the fore-part of the tongue. And the masses are rivers, seas, and the like.

That of which the sensation by touch is warm, they call Light. This is of two kinds, eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal, and in the form of products it is un-eternal. This light in the form of products is of three kinds, through these differences—body, sense, and mass. The body exists in the solar realm—this is a familiar assertion. The sense, the percipient of colour, which they call the Sight, resides in the fore-part of the pupil of the eye. And the masses are of four kinds, through these differences—produced in earth, produced in the sky, produced in the stomach, and produced in mines. Produced in earth, it is fire, &c. Produced in the sky, it is lightning and the like, the fuel of which is water. And that is resident in the stomach which is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. That light is produced in mines which, such as gold and the like, is found in mines.

*Remarks.*

But on this matter the learned inhabiting Europe say that the alvine heat is the effect of the digestion of things eaten, but not the cause. The explanation of this point is written fully in their books of chemical science.

In the *Nyáya Śástra* they say of the sense of Sight that it is light; and when, having gone out from the pupil of the eye, it

comes in contact with the object, then there is to the Soul the cognizance of colour. And in the *Bháshá-parichchheda* it is written that the Sight apprehends colour through its conjunction with light and with perceptible colour. But modern enquirers into the laws of vision say that we have the perception of colour from the coming of light into the eye, and not by the proceeding of colour from the eye to the object. As people strike a ball against a wall, and it comes back by reason of its elasticity, just so the light, having come from the sun or the like, having come in contact with a coloured object, goes into the eye. Then there is to the Soul the cognizance of colour. And Europeans believe that elasticity exists in Air, &c.; as it is written in the *Bháshá-parichchheda* that "Some people believe that elasticity exists in all the four elements."

### *Translation.*

That which has not colour, and has tangibility, they call Air. It is of two kinds—eternal and un-eternal. In the form of atoms it is eternal; and in the form of products it is un-eternal. Air in the form of products is of three kinds—through the differences of body, sense, and mass. The body is in the aerial world. The sense is the Touch, the apprehender of tangibility, existing throughout the whole body. Its mass is that which is the cause of the shaking of trees and the like.

### *Remarks.*

In these days people generally believe that air is a colourless substance; but others say that its colour is blue—and the proof of this shall be written where an account is given of the Qualities.

*Translation.*

Air circulating within the body is called *prána*. Although it is but one, yet, from the difference of its accidents, it is called breath, flatulence, cerebral pulsation, general pulsation, and digestion.

They call that Ether in which there resides the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

The cause of the employment of 'Past,' 'Present,' and 'Future,' they call Time. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

The cause of the employment of 'East,' 'West,' &c., they call Space. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.

The substratum of Knowledge (that is,—that in which knowledge resides)— they call Soul. It is of two kinds—the animal soul, and the Supreme soul. The Supreme soul is God, the Omniscient. He is One only, and devoid of joy or sorrow. And the animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal.

The sense which is the cause of the perception of pleasure and pain, &c., they call the Mind. And it is innumerable—for this reason that it remains with each Soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal.

*Remark.*

In the *Mímánsa Śástra* it is said that the mind is all-pervading; but the *Naiyáyikas* object, to this opinion, that if we admit the mind to be all-pervading, then it would at one time take cognizance of the objects of all the senses, and such cannot be the case.

*Translation.*

That quality which is apprehended only by the sense of Sight,

they call Colour. And this quality is of seven kinds—through these differences, white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and variegated. This quality resides in earth, water, and light. In earth, colour of all the seven kinds resides; and in water, white colour not lustrous resides; and lustrous white colour resides in light.

*Remark.*

According to modern European philosophers, all colour resides only in light, which we can exhibit, separated, by means of a prism—(a three-cornered stick of glass).

*Translation.*

The quality which is known through the sense of Taste, they call Savour. And it (namely, the quality of Savour) is of six kinds, through the differences of Sweet, Sour, Saline, Bitter, Astringent, and Pungent. This quality resides in earth and water. In earth there is savour of the six kinds; and in water there is only the sweet savour.

*Remark.*

Modern European philosophers say that in pure water there is no savour; and sweetness is found only in sugar and such things.

*Translation.*

The quality which is apprehended by the sense of Smell, they call Odour. It is of two kinds, fragrance and stench. This quality resides in earth alone.

They call that quality Tangibility which they perceive only by the organ of Touch. This quality is of three kinds, through the distinctions of cold, warm, and temperate, [that is to say, neither cold nor warm]. This quality resides in earth, water, light, and air. Coldness to the touch resides in water, warmth to the touch in light, and temperateness in earth and air.

The four of which Colour is the first, [that is to say, Colour, Savour, Odour, and Tangibility] may be produced in Earth [that is to say, in earthy things,] by maturation [that is to say, by the special conjunction of Heat], and they are then transient. In others [that is to say, in Water, Light, and Air,] Colour and the like are not produced by the conjunction of Heat. They are here eternal or transient. When they reside in eternal things they are eternal, and when they reside in things not eternal, they are said to be transient.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of Unity, and the like, Number. This, [that is to say, Number,] resides in the nine Substances; and, reckoning from Unity, it is as far as a "*lákh* of *lákhs* of *karors*." Unity is both eternal and un-eternal. It is eternal in an eternal thing, and un-eternal in an un-eternal thing:—but Duality, and the like, is everywhere un-eternal.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of Bulk, Measure. This quality resides in the nine Substances; and it, [that is to say, Measure,] is of four kinds—through the distinctions of small, great, long, and short.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] numerically distinct, Severalty. This quality resides in all the Substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] conjoined, Conjunction. This quality also resides in all the Substances.

They call the quality which annihilates Conjunction, Disjunction; and this resides in all the Substances.

They call the peculiar cause of the conception of [things as] Far and Near, Remoteness and Proximity. These qualities reside in earth, water, light, air, and mind. They are of two kinds—made by Space and made by Time. There is Remoteness made by space in that thing which remains in a distant place, and Proximity made by space in that thing which remains in a place near. In the person who is the elder, there is Remoteness made by time; and in the person who is the younger, there is Proximity made by time. [Distance and Proximity are determined by relation.]

They call the quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient falling, Weight. This quality resides in earth and in water.

The quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient trickling, [that is to say, oozing or melting or flowing,] is called Fluidity. It affects earth, light, and water. This quality is of two kinds—natural, [that is to say, established by its own nature,] and adscititious, [that is to say, produced by some cause]. Natural Fluidity resides in water. And adscititious Fluidity resides in earth and light. In earthy substances, butter and the like, Fluidity is produced by the conjunction of fire.

They call the quality which is the cause why particles and the like become a heap, Viscidity. This quality resides in water alone.

They call the quality which is apprehended by the organ of hearing, Sound. This quality resides only in the Ether. It is of two kinds—inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is produced by the instrumentality of a drum or the like. Sound which is in the shape of the Sanskrit, [the Hindí,] or any other language, is called articulate, [that is to say, in the form of syllables].

Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception, [that can

be put in words] they call Understanding. It is of two kinds, Remembrance and Notion.

The knowledge which is produced only by its own antecedence [i. e. by itself as its own antecedent], they call Remembrance :—and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion. This, [that is to say, Notion,] is of two kinds—right and wrong.

Of whatever description any thing is, when our idea of that thing is of that same description, it is called a right notion :—as, in the case of Silver, the idea of its being Silver. This is called *pramá* [that is to say, commensurate with its object.] The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not—such a notion is called a wrong notion :—as, in the case of a [pearly] Shell, the notion of its being Silver.

Right notion is of four kinds, according to the division of Perceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from similarity, and authoritative Assertions understood. And the efficient causes of these, [that is to say, their peculiar causes,] also are of four kinds—according to the division of Perception, Inference, Recognition of similarity, and authoritative Assertion.

Whatever thing, through its operating, is the cause, not common to all effects, of some given effect, that is the instrumental cause thereof.

That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted—[i. e., is not by any thing else,—except the result in question,—constituted a cause]—is the cause [of that product].

That which annuls its own antecedent non-existence is called an Effect.

Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That in which an effect inti-

mately relative to it takes its rise, is an intimate cause [of that effect], as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object [as a necessarily immanent cause] with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, the loom, &c., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition [of all effects, as God, time, place, &c., are].

The cause of the knowledge [called] sensation is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense and its object, is sensation. It is of two kinds, where it does not pay regard to an alternative, and where it does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alternative is that which involves no specification, as in the simple cognition that 'this is something that exists.' The knowledge which contemplates an alternative is that which includes a specification, as 'This is *Ḍittha*,' 'This is a *Brâhmaṇa*,' 'this is black.'

The relative proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds, (1.) conjunction, (2.) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (3.) intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, (4.) intimate union, (5.) intimate union with that which is intimately united, and (6.) the connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. For example, when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is [between the sense and the object] the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of intimate union with that which is in conjunction, because the colour is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense

of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generically is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, because the generic property of being a colour is intimately united with the particular colour which is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is intimate union between a quality and that of which it is the quality. In the perception of the nature of sound [in a given sound of which we are cognizant] the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united, because the nature of sound is intimately united with sound which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the proximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which is so distinguished, because when the ground is [perceived to be] possessed of the nonexistence of a jar, the nonexistence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision.

Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense. Thus it is settled that an organ of sense is what gives us the knowledge called sensation.

So much for the chapter on Sense.

The instrument [in the production] of an inference is a generalized fact. An inference is the knowledge that arises from deduction. Deduction is the ascertaining that the subject possesses that character which is invariably attended [by what we then predicate of it]. For example, the knowledge that 'this hill is characterised by smoke, which is always attended by fire,' is a deductive application of a general principle; the knowledge

produced from which, viz. that 'the hill is fiery,' is an inference. Invariable attendedness is the fact of being constantly accompanied,—as in the example 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire [by which it is invariably attended].' By 'the subject's possessing a character, &c.' we mean that in a mountain or the like there is present that [e. g., smoke] which is invariably attended [e. g., by fire].

A general principle is of two kinds, in so far as it may be useful for one's self, and for another. That which is employed for one's self is the cause of a private conclusion in one's own mind. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having assumed that the concomitancy is invariable, having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendance of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that 'this mountain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended by fire.' This is called *linga-parámarśa*, which means the consideration of a sign. Thence is produced the knowledge that the 'mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion *(anumiti)*. This is the process of inference for one's self.

But, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example, (1.) The mountain is fiery; (2.) because it smokes; (3.) whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth; (4.) and this does so; (5.) therefore it is fiery as aforesaid. In consequence of the token here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire.

The five members of this syllogism are severally named: (1.) the proposition, (2.) the reason, (3.) the example, (4.) the application, and (5.) the conclusion. 'The mountain is fiery' is the

proposition; 'because of its being smoky' is the reason; 'whatever is smoky, &c.' is the example; 'and so this mountain is' is the application; 'therefore the mountain is fiery' is the conclusion.

The cause of an inference *(anumiti)* whether for one's self or for another, is simply the consideration of a sign; therefore the *anumána* [which was previously stated to be the cause of an inference] is just this consideration of a sign.

A sign or token *(linga)* is of three sorts, (1.) that which may betoken by its presence or by its absence *(anwaya-vyatireki)*; (2.) that which betokens only by its presence *(kewalánwayi)*; and (3.) that which betokens only by its absence *(kewalavyatireki)*. The first is that token which is possessed of pervading inherence *(vyápti)* both in respect of its association [with the thing which it betokens], and its absence [when the thing it betokens is absent], as, for example, *smokiness* when *fire* is to be proved. When it is said, 'where there is smoke there is fire, as on a culinary hearth,' we have a case of concomitant presence. When it is said, 'where fire is not, there smoke also is not, as in a great deep lake,' we have a case of concomitant absence. The second is that token which has no negative instance, as when it is said, 'the jar is nameable because it is cognizable, as cloth is,' there is no instance of nameableness or of cognizableness being present where the other is absent, because everything [that we can be conversant about] is both cognizable and nameable. The third is that token in regard to which we can reason only from its invariable absence. For example, [we might argue as follows]:—

(1.) Earth is different from these [other elements]:

(2.) Because it is odorous:

(3.) Nothing that is not different from these [other elements] is odorous—as water, [for example, is not odorous]:

(4.) But this [earth] is not inodorous :—

(5.) Therefore it is different from the other elements :—

but if [in the third member of the argument] we had argued [affirmatively] that 'what possesses odour is different from the other elements,' we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing that of earth alone can that property be asserted.

That whose possession of what is to be established is doubtful is called the subject *(paksha)*; as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is assigned as the reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side *(sapaksha)*; as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is called an instance on the opposite side *(vipaksha)*; as the great deep lake, in the same example.

The five that merely present the appearance of a reason *(hetwábhása)*, are (1.) that which goes astray, (2.) that which would prove the contradictory, (3.) that where there is an equally strong argument on the other side, (4). the unreal, and (5.) the futile.

The alleged reason which goes astray *(savyabhichára)*, is that which has not just the one conclusion. It is of three kinds—(1.) What would prove too much *(sádháraṇa)*; (2.) what belongs to none besides the individual *(asádháraṇa)*; and (3.) the non-exclusive *(anupasanhári)*. The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is alleged as the proof may be present whilst that which is to be proved is absent :—as for instance, if one should say, 'The mountain is fiery, because it is an object of right knowledge,' [the reason assigned would be liable to this objection] because the being an object that may be rightly known is predicable also of a lake, which is characterised by the absence of fire.

That [pretended token] which belongs neither to any similar instance nor to any one dissimilar, is one devoid of community *(asádháraṇa)*. As, when one says 'Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.' Now the nature of sound belongs to sound alone, and to nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal.

The pretended argument, which can bring an example neither in support nor in opposition, is non-exclusive *(anupasanhárí)*. For example—should one say, 'Every thing is uneternal, because it is cognizable'—there would be no example to cite, because 'every thing' (leaving nothing over) is the subject of the conclusion.

A reason proving the reverse *(viruddha)*, is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be proved. For example —suppose one should say, 'sound is eternal because it is created.' [We should reject his argument at once, because the fact of having been created implies non-eternity—the negation of being eternal.]

A counterbalanced reason *(satpratipaksha)* is that along with which there exists another reason, which [equally well] establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible, as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be),' (it might be argued, with equal force on the other side, that) 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is.'

An unreal reason is threefold—(1) where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside *(ásrayásiddha)*; (2) where the nature alleged does not really reside in the subject *(swarúpásiddha)*; and (3)

where the alleged invariableness of concomitancy is not real *(vyápyatwásiddha)*.

(As an example of) the fallacy of non-existent locality, (suppose that one argues), 'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake'—here the sky-lotus is (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus), and in fact it (the sky lotus) does not exist.

As (an example of) an argument where the nature does not really exist in the subject, (suppose one were to argue), 'Sound is a quality, because it is visible'—here (every one would perceive at once, that) visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by the hearing (not by vision).

A reason, when there is an indispensable condition, is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. Such an indispensable condition *(upádhi)* is what always attends the property to be established, but does not always attend what is brought forward in proof.

Invariable attendance on the property to be established *(sádhya-vyápakatwa)* consists in the not being the counterentity *(apratiyogitwa)* of the absolute non-existence *(atyantábháva)* which has the same location as *(samánádhikaraṇa)* that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on what is brought forward in proof *(sádhanávyápakatwa)* consists in the being the counterentity *(pratiyogitwa)* of the non-existence which has what is brought forward in proof.

(Suppose it to be argued that), 'The mountain must smoke, because it is fiery'—in this case the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. For 'wherever there is smoke,

there is the conjunction of wet fuel'—so that we have here invariable attendance on what is to be proved *(sádhyavyápakatá)*. But it is not true that 'wherever there is fire, there there is conjunction of wet fuel'—for there is no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an (ignited) iron ball—so we have here non-invariable attendance on the proof *(sádhanávyápakatá)*. As there is thus its invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition for the sufficiency of the reason alleged. As it would require this additional condition (in order to prove that smoke must be present), fieriness (in the argument before us) is faulty as regards comprehensiveness.

An argument is futile *(bádhita)* when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example (it may be argued that), 'Fire is cold, because it is a substance.' There coldness is to be proved; and its opposite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the argument is futile.

Thus has Inference been expounded.

Comparison or the recognition of likeness, *(upamána)* is the cause of an inference from similarity *(upamiti)*. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example—a person not knowing what is meant by the word *gavaya* (Bos gavaeus), having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a *gavaya* is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow.

Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind), that 'this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'

Thus has comparison been expounded.

A word (or right assertion) is the speech of one worthy (of confidence). One worthy, is a speaker of the truth. A speech (or sentence) is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, 'Bring the cow.' A significant sound *(pada)* is that which is possessed of power (to convey a meaning). The power (of a word) is the appointment, in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound.

The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the interdependence, compatibility, and juxtaposition (of the words).

Interdependence *(ákánkshá)* means the inability in a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word. Compatibility *(yogyatá)* consists in (a word's) not rendering futile the sense (of the sentence). Juxtaposition *(sannidhi)* consists in the enunciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.

A collection of words devoid of interdependence, &c. is no valid sentence—for example 'cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no information, the words not looking out for one another.

The expression 'He should irrigate with fire' is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation).

The words 'Bring—the—cow'—not pronounced close together but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of) juxtaposition.

Speech is of two kinds, temporal or profane *(laukika)* and sacred *(vaidika)*. The former, being uttered by God, is all-authoritative: but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative; any other is not so.

The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbally communicated knowledge; its instrumental cause is language.

Thus has been explained what constitutes correct knowledge.

Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, according to the division of doubt, mistake, and [such opinion as is open to] *reductio ad absurdum*.

The recognition, in one [and the same] thing possessing a certain nature, of several heterogeneous natures as characterising it, is doubt *(sanśaya)*. For example 'a post, or a man.'

Apprehending falsely is mistake *(viparyaya)*. For example in the case of mother o'pearl, the idea that this is silver.

*Reductio ad absurdum (tarka)* consists in establishing the pervader [here supposed to be denied] through the allegation of the pervaded [here supposed to be granted]. For example, 'If there were not fire [which you deny], then there would not be smoke [which you admit there is].'

Memory also is of two kinds, correct and incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect knowledge.

What all perceive to be agreeable, is pleasure *(sukha)*; what appears disagreeable, is pain *(du'kha)*.

Desire *(ichchhá)* means wishing. Aversion *(dwesha)* means disliking. Effort *(prayatna)* means action.

Virtue, or merit, *(dharmma)* arises from the performance of what is enjoined: but vice, or demerit *(adharmma)* from the performance of what is forbidden.

The eight qualities,—Intellect and the rest,—are distinctive of Soul alone.

Intellect, desire, and effort, are of two kinds, eternal and transient; eternal in God, transient in mortals.

Quality selfreproductive *(sanskára)* is of three kinds, momentum, imagination, and elasticity. Momentum *(vega)* resides in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind. Imagination *(bhávaná)*, the cause of memory, and arising from notion, resides only in the Soul. Elasticity *(sthitisthápaka)* is that which restores to its former position what had been altered. It resides in mats and the like formed of the earthy element.

So much for the Qualities.

Action consists in motion.

Casting upward *(utkshepaṇa)* is the cause of conjunction with a higher place. Casting downward *(apakshepaṇa)* is the cause of

contact with a lower place. Contraction *(ákunchana)* is the cause of conjunction with what is near the body. Dilatation *(prasáraṇa)* is the cause of conjunction with what is distant. Going *(gamana)* is the name of every other variety. Action resides only in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind.

Community, or Genus, *(sámánya)* is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is of two kinds, higher and lower. The highest degree of community [or the *summum genus*] is existence. A lower genus is such a one as Substantiality [the common nature of what are called Substances].

Differences *(viśesha)* residing in eternal substances, are excluders [of each from community of nature with the others].

Intimate relation *(samaváya)* is constant connection. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, difference and eternal substances.

Antecedent non-existence *(prágabháva)* is without beginning, and has an end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction *(pradhwansa)* has a beginning, and no end. [Such is the non-existence] of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence *(atyantábháva)* is that the counterentity whereof is considered independently of the three times [past, present, and future.] For example—[such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that] there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence, or difference, *(anyonyábháva)* is that the counterentity whereof is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For exam-

ple [such difference is referred to when it is remarked that] a jar is not a web of cloth.

Since everything is properly included under the categories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories.

This Compendium of Logical Results was composed by the learned *Annam Bhaṭṭa*, in order to perfect the acquaintance of students with the opinions of *Kanáḍa* and of the *Nyáya*.

Thus is the *Tarka-sangraha* completed.